

Circulation, Conditions, Claims: Examining the Politics of Historical Memory in Eastern Europe

Félix Krawatzek 

*Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS), Berlin, Germany
Nuffield College, Oxford, United Kingdom*

George Soroka 

Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA

Across Eastern Europe how the past is remembered has become a crucial factor for understanding present-day political developments within and between states. In this introduction, we first present the articles that form part of this special section through a discussion of the various methods used by the authors to demonstrate the potential ways into studying collective memory. We then define the regional characteristics of Eastern Europe's mnemonic politics and the reasons for their oftentimes conflictual character. Thereafter we consider three thematic arenas that situate the individual contributions to this special section within the wider scholarly debate. First, we examine the institutional and structural conditions that shape the circulation of memory and lead to conflictive constellations of remembering; second, we discuss how different regime types and cultural rules influence the framing of historical episodes, paying attention to supranational integration and the role of technological change; third, we consider the different types of actors that shape the present recall of the past, including political elites, social movements, and society at large. We conclude by identifying several promising avenues for further research.

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Three decades after the Warsaw Pact crumbled, the transition away from communist rule no longer represents the dominant political paradigm in Eastern Europe.¹ By the mid-2000s, the states arrayed between Russia and Germany had already reconfigured their political realities, with the resulting regimes running the gamut from liberal democracy to neo-authoritarianism.² New ideological commitments, however, rarely proved stable or enduring. Attesting to this is the recent rise of illiberal nationalism and nativist populism in countries such as Hungary and Poland, once the undisputed success stories of post-communist democratization efforts.³ This political instability in the post-communist space encompasses a growing backlash against the project of European integration, affecting even states that

previously appeared firmly anchored in the European Union. Given this context, a particularly striking feature of both the domestic and international politics of Eastern European countries is the framing of present-day political debates through recourse to contentious historical narratives.⁴ Indeed, the politics of historical memory appear “here to stay,” influencing not only the domestic sphere but also relations between states in a region where much of the past remains contested.

Both the content and dynamics of Eastern Europe’s memory politics are noteworthy, in that they frequently vary from what prevails in the former Soviet “core” states and those of Western Europe. Furthermore, these historical narratives increasingly circulate and are reproduced in new contexts because of factors such as migration and the growth of transnational media. This circulation of how the past is interpreted has important political implications, particularly as Eastern Europe is neither sealed off from the rest of the world nor unified in how the past is remembered. But while a homogenous mnemonic identity does not exist, the post-communist space nonetheless exhibits certain distinctive interpretive characteristics that relate to its shared experiences. Eastern Europe thus represents an intriguing region for analysis, as in key respects it differs from other geographic areas, while in others it mirrors the broader processes governing how historical memory and politics are coming to interact.

Effectively parsing this phenomenon involves taking notice of three interrelated arenas: (1) the circulation of memories, demonstrating the intrinsically entangled nature of recalling the past and the resulting movement of narratives between and within countries; (2) the factors that condition what is remembered (e.g., political and cultural context) and how remembering takes place (e.g., via new media technologies); (3) the actors involved, who range from political elites to ordinary citizens, and the historical claims they make. Taken together, these three arenas provide a heuristic that specifically aims at helping us to understand processes of remembering in Eastern Europe over time, but one that is not limited to only being applied to this region. Below, we discuss these arenas in greater detail to showcase their relevance to Eastern Europe.

First, there is the *circulation of memories and their conflictive constellations* to consider. This speaks to the centrality of understanding how and why historical narratives move across space and time, as well as the political and societal feedback processes that exist between countries and across regions. This arena is especially salient given the high level of cross-border mnemonic exchange in Eastern Europe, where political actors routinely formulate historical narratives in conscious contradiction to the ways in which these have been developed elsewhere. Meanwhile, politicians and other mnemonic actors in the region not only react to dissonant interpretations of the past circulating within their respective spheres of influence, but also spread localized narratives beyond their previous boundaries. Eastern Europe’s unsettled twentieth century, which witnessed the massive displacement of peoples and wholesale movement of borders,⁵ renders it particularly well-suited for studying

the multiple levels on which the politics of the past play out, as well as their deeply intertwined character.

Second, we emphasize the need to study the *factors that condition remembering*, particularly how mnemonic actors relate to various institutional and structural constraints. In this respect, we consider the effects of regime type, as well as differing cultural norms and expectations, to be particularly salient for understanding how the past is filtered through the lens of present-day politics. Conditioning factors stem from the national as well as the supranational arena, while technological developments contribute to the way in which they unfold. Examining the cadence of memory conflicts provides us with insight into the ways in which the development and subsequent evolution of political regimes links with the cultivation of historical narratives. However, achieving a nuanced understanding of the dynamics behind memory conflicts also requires that we consider the role of deep and subjacent cultural rules such as language,⁶ which likewise contribute to framing historical narratives. This is important to take account of, as decision-making processes at both the individual and group level are ultimately embedded within wider systems of constructing meaning that define the parameters of how the past may be depicted and delineate appropriate behaviors relative to this.⁷ As a result, political actors are sensitive to cultural context when undertaking the activation of historical interpretations. They may refer to the past in idiosyncratic ways, but these interpretations need to be at least minimally congruent with pre-existing cultural rules—meaning the socially shared and collectively negotiated guidance for action that forms the basis for consistent interpretation⁸—if they are to have any prospects of achieving long-term resonance within society.

Third, one needs to systematically assess who the relevant socio-political *actors are and what their mnemonic claims entail*. Which individuals or groups can legitimately speak about the past in an authoritative manner, and why do they assume their respective interpretive positions?⁹ Tied to this are salient questions regarding the ways in which hegemonic narratives are established and challenged. How does public opinion, for instance, relate to top-down mnemonic initiatives that emanate from political, economic, or cultural elites in contrast to those promulgated by civil society or social movements? Likewise, how does the maintenance of transnational ties and these actors' engagement with epistemic communities affect agenda-setting behavior, especially across multiple levels?¹⁰ Lastly, we cannot ignore the persistent echo of those who can no longer speak for themselves but who now have others claiming to speak on their behalf. This concerns primarily the Jews who perished in the Holocaust and whose deaths fundamentally reshaped the identity of Eastern Europe.

This special section brings together a group of contributors who study the contemporary political resonances of the past and their manifestations in a number of contexts. The articles contained herein all speak to multiple of the above arenas, but for the purpose of guiding the reader it is worth highlighting which of these the individual pieces specifically emphasize. Olga Davydova-Minguet looks at how Russian

mnemonic traditions and narratives traveled to Finland with Russian-speaking migrants, where today they challenge the dominant historical understandings of the titular nation through the re-creation of such commemorative practices as the Immortal Regiment march.¹¹ Further explicating the circulation of memory, Nikolay Kopusov examines the emergence of conflicting memory laws in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine that nonetheless possess common conceptual and practical goals.¹² With a similar emphasis on mnemonic movement, Susan Divald examines the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and why it invokes certain historical tropes while downplaying others.¹³ Meanwhile, George Soroka looks at how the 1940 Katyń massacre has factored into relations between post-Soviet Russia and Poland, examining why this incident remains highly politically charged while mnemonic controversies between Poland and Ukraine over the massacre of Polish civilians that took place in Volhynia and eastern Galicia between 1943 and 1945 have been far more muted.¹⁴ The latter two authors' arguments also relate strongly to arena two and the role of conditioning factors such as regime type. Meanwhile, Félix Krawatzek's analysis of contemporary youth attitudes and knowledge regarding collaboration during the Second World War in Belarus and Latvia explicitly demonstrates the importance of the cultural-linguistic divide and thus the important conditioning factor of language and ensuing cultural belonging.¹⁵

Below we proceed by first discussing the various methods and approaches the authors have employed. In doing so, we also suggest how these can, either separately or jointly, advance the state of memory studies in the social sciences and humanities. We likewise discuss the contributions to this special section in relation to the broader literature on how representations of the past affect contemporary politics. A second section reviews the particulars of regional dynamics across Eastern Europe, after which we survey the three analytical arenas noted above. Specifically, we evaluate the circulation of memories, which can be accounted for by four distinct components. Next, we assess the factors that condition how remembering occurs, along with examining the identities of the relevant mnemonic actors and how they exert their influence. This introduction concludes by offering avenues for further research.

Methods for Understanding the Politics of Historical Memory

The articles in this section showcase the diversity of approaches that exist for addressing memory and its political implications, in that they all proceed from slightly different ontological premises and consequently employ various methodologies. Examining how our authors study historical remembering therefore provides a comprehensive overview of the types of analytical approaches that have emerged from the field of memory studies.

Ethnographic methods such as those employed by Davydova-Minguet entail fieldwork and participant observation. These allow her to observe how the

transnational circulation of commemorative practices among Russian-speakers in Finland, coupled with the resonance of event framing, does not require them to make a clear-cut choice between embracing loyalty to their place of origin or place of residence. They likewise permit the author to illustrate how disparate mnemonic elements may travel beyond their original contexts of creation and be juxtaposed in unexpected ways, as when marchers commemorated those who perished in World War II while also demonstrating their support for the self-styled “Donetsk People’s Republic” in the Donbas, thereby overtly linking events from far different time periods and geopolitical contexts. Ethnographic approaches are moreover helpful in assessing the significance of symbols and the evolution of their meanings over time, whether these be physical objects like the orange-and-black St. George’s Ribbon or such cultural artifacts as Soviet songs from the World War II era. This approach allows Davydova-Minguet to fruitfully explore the spatial conundrums frequently raised by the expression of memory politics in transnational contexts. For many participants in the Immortal Regiment commemorations outside of Russia, a very practical problem is where to lay flowers, parade, or sing traditional songs when the host society is not attuned to the contextualizing narratives that form the background for such practices, or may even overtly oppose them.¹⁶

Another main method involves conducting interviews with political leaders and others capable of shaping policy relative to historical remembering. Many of these interviews will take place at the level of political elites, but they may also encompass members of civil society and social movements. Among our authors, Divald most directly relies on interviews to unpack the fraught term “autonomy” and why it is studiously avoided by Hungarians in Slovakia. She likewise draws on discussions with representatives of this community to expand on the mnemonic relationship that exists between it and the “kin-state” (Hungary proper), and to examine how this relationship impacts the functioning of political parties identified with the Hungarian minority in Slovakia.¹⁷

A different but no less important method consists of content analysis, which can be performed on various types of documents, including newspaper accounts, position papers, political speeches, press releases, and records of legislative debates. Most of the pieces in this volume employ a qualitative version of content analysis, but memory can also be studied via quantitative means.¹⁸ The primary analytic power of content analysis lies in its ability to elucidate not only the ways in which semantic constructs encode culturally and politically conditioned historical interpretations, but also how they project the past into present-day political relevance. In addition, content analysis may likewise be employed to code other, nontextual sources of data, as Divald does with commemorative events.¹⁹

Along similar lines, survey research and public-opinion polling is proving invaluable for ascertaining how people conceive of the past, what political functions the past performs, and how successful attempts to politically activate it may be. In the current collection, Krawatzek uses these tools to push for a more systematic

understanding of the mnemonic narratives that the broader population holds. In his case, this involves examining the recall among youth in Belarus and Latvia of a particularly conflictual aspect of World War II, namely the issue of collaboration.²⁰

Finally, there is process tracing, which need not be a stand-alone method as it can complement the above-noted approaches. Attesting to this, it is employed to various degrees by all the authors surveyed here, but is perhaps most evident in the articles by Kuposov and Soroka. Careful process tracing is especially appropriate if the researcher's goal is to make a credible causal argument through the use of predominantly qualitative data and how it is situated in time.²¹ This is because process tracing can assist in clarifying the complex chains of events that are critical to comprehending the stepwise unfolding of diachronic effects. The collapse of the Soviet Union illustrates the challenges that exist with respect to establishing causal directionality. This event indelibly changed the region's mnemonic landscape, and it was simultaneously brought about by the nationally oriented conversations—which often centered on alternate ways of remembering the recent past—that become prominent in the mid-to-late 1980s. The ability to have these conversations was the result of underlying political developments, most notably the introduction of Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms. However, they also had their origins in other phenomena, prominent among them the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident. Without a nuanced appreciation for the entangled processes that brought about these results, it would be very difficult to make any systematic claims regarding their temporal sequencing.

If the goal is to achieve a more rigorous analysis of the mechanisms through which mnemonic politics operate and the outcomes they bring about,²² social scientists will ultimately have to embrace all of these methods, as each provides a different point of entry into the complex dynamics of how memory matters for understanding political outcomes and the events leading up to them. But in making this claim, we should not ignore their epistemological foundations and the disparate ways in which these can be operationalized. Moreover, as the field advances, scholars will undoubtedly move from predominantly emphasizing interpretive means of causal argumentation to searching for other explanatory patterns. In studying a phenomenon as complex and overdetermined as the politics of historical recall there will remain ample room for multiple approaches, as well as for normative theorizing concerning the motivations for interjecting the past into the present.

Eastern Europe as a Region of Memory

Regional legacies create dynamics that shape distinctive contours of remembering over time. This is especially true in Eastern Europe, where mnemonic understandings differ from those exhibited elsewhere in Europe.²³ The key to parsing how the past is interpreted here requires recognizing that states in this region share a number of formative meta-experiences. It is likewise necessary to consider what has

been made of these experiences, meaning how they have been recognized or ignored within—as well as beyond—the immediate geographic space. Consequently, the powerful significance of the five regionwide factors detailed below must be taken seriously if one hopes to comprehend the frequently conflictive nature of mnemonic politics in this part of Europe.

Collapse of Multinational Empires

First, we should consider the collapse of the multinational empires that existed throughout this region prior to World War I. The imperial experience is important to this day, as these empires frequently fostered either the conspicuous reification of emergent ethno-national and linguistic identities²⁴ or else endeavored to actively thwart them.²⁵ These actions were intended to maintain control over the populations in question, as well as to quash the ambitions of competing imperial powers eager to extend their geopolitical influence.²⁶

Within their respective purviews, the Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman empires provided a common, overarching political identity for the diverse cultural and religious groups of the territories they controlled.²⁷ Their disintegration had numerous implications, including augmenting overlapping territorial claims and creating new states wherein minority-group identities became more politically salient.²⁸ For example, after the break-up of Austria-Hungary following World War I, the terms of the 1920 Treaty of Trianon left sizable enclaves of Hungarian speakers in neighboring countries such as Slovakia and Romania.²⁹ This imposition of new geopolitical borders, coupled with their subsequent shifts, further enabled national identities to burgeon throughout the region, although considerably later than throughout most of Western Europe.³⁰ Indeed, it was the West that provided a template for the consolidation of these politicized identities across Eastern Europe after World War I, in an emulative process remarkably akin to the ways in which Western political and economic standards were uncritically adopted following the Soviet Union's breakdown.³¹

Impact of World War II

Next, the impact of World War II and its aftermath continues to be felt with keen acuity throughout Eastern Europe. As Timothy Snyder and others have observed, in this region wartime violence was experienced much more intensely than in Western Europe, and directly affected civilians in far greater numbers.³² This was particularly true in Poland and what were then the Soviet dominions of the Baltics, Belarus, and Ukraine. Within these locales, virtually all families harbor an account of having close relatives murdered and experiencing severe privation during the war. Attesting to this, Poland lost nearly 20 percent of its prewar population between 1939 and 1945, compared with population losses of less than 2 percent in France and 1 percent

in the United Kingdom.³³ Specific acts of violence were also more targeted in Eastern Europe. In particular, the genocide of the Jews and other ethnically motivated atrocities, along with the magnitude of forced population transfers, imprinted themselves deeply on the region.

Building Communism

The transformative project of building communism in Eastern Europe that followed in the wake of World War II continues to affect the attitudes of citizens.³⁴ Examining the legacy of communism and Soviet domination therefore remains crucial for any analysis of Eastern Europe,³⁵ as for much of the twentieth century the USSR formed a hegemonic interpretive backdrop for this region.³⁶ During this period the writing of history was subordinated to politics, leading to ideologically conditioned lies, distortions, and enforced silences concerning the past, particularly as these related to the Second World War and the ensuing imposition of communist rule. Marxist legacies, however, are remembered in diverse ways because they were experienced differently. The “goulash communism” of János Kádár in post-1956 Hungary differed markedly from the megalomaniacal repression that characterized Nicolae Ceaușescu’s Romania or the beleaguered state-led socialism of Poland under Wojciech Jaruzelski. It is therefore unsurprising that communism’s legacies are today understood variously throughout these societies. Nonetheless, we also observe regionwide changes in how the communist period has been perceived. Whereas the dominant storyline undergirding the commemorations of the twentieth anniversary of communism’s collapse in 2009 was still one of ushering in democracy and a market economy, the thirtieth anniversary in 2019 gave rise to a much more critical discourse, with commemorative debates featuring prominent discussions of the transition’s negative aspects, including economic crises, demographic deficits, and the perceived loss of communal purpose and meaning.

Fall of Multinational States

More proximate events likewise shape the mnemonic dynamics exhibited in the region. Especially relevant in this regard is the USSR’s dissolution and its aftermath, which permitted previously suppressed counter-memories to gain traction and public visibility. The Soviet Union’s collapse was not just a cause of historical contestation in Eastern Europe but also, in part, a result of the nationalized contestation of the past that began to emerge immediately after Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of *glasnost*’ went into effect in the mid-1980s.³⁷

Most striking in this respect are national stories of opposition and suffering that could not be openly discussed for much of the Soviet era. At the political level, this has led to governmental attempts to codify revised interpretations of history, as Kaposov illustrates with regard to Poland and Ukraine.³⁸ Meanwhile, in the Baltics a

corollary reshaping of how national history is interpreted has occurred, a phenomenon discussed by Krawatzek.³⁹ However, these mnemonic shifts were not just confined to states that were previously subalterns in a Soviet-dominated system. In the immediate aftermath of the USSR's fall, Russia was also quite self-critical when assessing its recent history, especially the Stalinist period. In fact, during the early 1990s such an approach was seen as a core component of Russia's attempt to democratize.

Combined, these formative experiences left an indelible mark on the political culture of Eastern Europe, embedding it in a shifting and entangled field of memory.⁴⁰ The dynamics evinced across the Western Balkans are particularly relevant for illustrating the complex interactions between these experiences; there it was older memories of interethnic violence that stood in the way of the "brotherhood and unity" stressed in communist Yugoslavia's founding narrative.⁴¹ At the same time, however, the region's complicated World War II legacy did not allow easy distinctions to be drawn between victims and perpetrators, or which groups were legitimate members of the opposition during the Nazi occupation.

European Integration

Eastern Europe's desire to integrate into, or at the very least seek closer association with, the institutional infrastructure of the EU was paralleled by its desire to elevate regional experiences of World War II to the level of pan-European memory.⁴² However, interpretations of the past that were uncontroversial and widely accepted in post-communist Europe, particularly the idea that the violence of World War II primarily affected dominant nationalities such as the Poles, Ukrainians or Belarusians rather than the Jews, challenged the narrative of World War II that had been cultivated in the EU, particularly by France and Germany. Moreover, in large part because national identity was poorly developed or its expression stunted in many Eastern European states, political leaders as well as societies have tended to search for affirmative episodes and interpretations that depict important historical figures and events in a heroic light, while downplaying or whitewashing those that question this script. One pernicious consequence of this is that blame for negative historical episodes is often attributed to convenient scapegoats, whether these be neighboring polities or national minorities. Indeed, the emphasis on universal suffering, which is central to the concept of cosmopolitan memory as defined by Levy and Sznajder, has always been reluctantly received in Eastern Europe, where the suffering of the titular nationality tends to be foregrounded, along with its opposition to the Nazi and Soviet occupiers.⁴³

Circulation of Memories and Conflictive Constellations

Having established the main historical-political parameters of this mnemonic region, we now turn to the first arena for understanding the processes that regulate

remembering. Falling within the category of the circulation of memory are four components: (a) the diffusion and contestation of memories; (b) historical minorities and the movement of borders; (c) legacies of past populations; (d) the continuing proximity evinced between perpetrators and victims. These factors are certainly not unique to Eastern Europe, but the level of their political relevance in this region is pronounced.

Diffusion and Contestation of Memories

The *diffusion and contestation* of memories has been enabled and exacerbated by the waves of migration that followed the breakdown of multinational states such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, as well as by the project of European integration.⁴⁴ However, these processes are not just confined to cross-border interactions; they may also occur within states, notably because of the surfacing of previously suppressed interpretations of the past. Consequently, we understand mnemonic diffusion and the contestation that frequently results from it to be an outcome of iterative cycles of communication such as occur, for example, between migrants and their friends and families in the country of origin or subgroups within a given society. At the same time, we acknowledge that the trajectory of historical narratives is oftentimes heavily influenced by the strategic considerations of political and other elites.

In particular, the diffusion of contentious memories through migration has created the potential to change national rules of remembering, as exemplified by the Immortal Regiment marches in Finland. Davydova-Minguet contrasts Finnish remembrance prior to 1991, when emphasis was placed on recalling the sacrifice that Finns made for national independence in the back-to-back wars they fought against the USSR (1939–1940, 1941–1944), with today's celebrations by Russian immigrants to Finland of the Soviet victory in World War II. Such a translocation of a decidedly Russo-centric interpretation speaks to extensive mnemonic diffusion. This is crucial to take note of, as in Finland Russian-speakers now make up the largest foreign-language group: as of late 2017, seventy-seven thousand individuals declared their mother tongue to be Russian out of a total population of 5.5 million. Additionally, many of them maintain affective ties to Russia and engage primarily with Russian-language media.⁴⁵

While memories are fragmented and conflicted in every society,⁴⁶ this fragmentation is even more pronounced in the presence of migrant communities. Mnemonic integration often proves difficult due to the competing historical experiences emphasized by these groups. Researchers have found, for instance, that it is hard for Turkish migrants in Germany to achieve an emotional engagement with the Holocaust,⁴⁷ which has implications for, among other things, how history is taught in German schools. Moreover, affective ties that span borders can amplify these distinctions, as demonstrated by the current Russian government's efforts to shape the

cultural values and, by extension, historical recall, of Russian-speaking communities around the globe.⁴⁸ However, while in this context the emergence of a distinctively Russophone memory could be seen as emancipating a previously marginalized minority memory, the degree of its politicization seriously challenges established national frames of remembrance. Davydova-Minguet, for example, suggests that not only does the commemoration of the Immortal Regiment in Finland unite Russian speakers and reproduce a movement closely tied to the Russian state, but that it also erects an effective barrier to their integration into Finnish society.⁴⁹ More broadly, the grassroots character of the Immortal Regiment creates mnemonic bridges between Russian speakers across the globe and provides them with a feeling of unity, albeit one that is insular in its insistence that the Western European narrative, in ignoring the Soviet experience, is at best incomplete and at worst duplicitous.

Meanwhile, the competitive replication of memories across the region illustrates a different type of state-sponsored diffusion. This phenomenon is particularly evident today in the relations Poland and Ukraine exhibit with Russia, although comparable dynamics are evinced between the Baltic states and Russia as well. In these cases, we witness how much mnemonic disagreements depend on the relative geopolitical strength of the states involved and the degree to which one side or the other can effectively control the narrative beyond its immediate borders.⁵⁰ This observation explains why a contentious historical narrative promulgated by Russia has far more reach and resonance than a similar narrative being promoted by a weaker state, as Soroka discusses.⁵¹

Whereas memory was of less relevance in the relations between these countries in the 1990s, when regime transitions were ongoing and political rhetoric was more future-oriented, this changed once the economic and social hardships engendered by the transition began to foment the insertion of ethnonationalist claims into politics, which served to radically alter historical perceptions. To that effect, politicians within Eastern Europe have developed a habit of using legislation to reshape the past for purposes of nation-building, despite the presence of similar mnemonic phenomena in other regional contexts, notably East Asia and Latin America.⁵² This legal institutionalization of history has resulted in, among other outcomes, a cascade of memory laws.⁵³ Moreover, the political impetus for “juridifying” the past frequently derives from the interpretive stances adopted in neighboring countries. This cross-border dynamic dates to the 1990s, when keeping a close watch on how surrounding states interpreted history was driven by the fear of having one’s own post-communist perspective challenged or discredited. Initially, this process did not take place in a self-exculpatory or aggressive way. However, memory laws of the second generation, which date from the 2000s, frequently comprise direct responses to perceived mnemonic hostility on the part of other states.⁵⁴

Mnemonic rules also diffuse across borders, with their reception dependent on the regime types of the countries in question. This phenomenon is taken up by Kopolov, who focuses on the rise of national populism and memory laws that enshrine

particularistic meanings of the past in ways that are calculated to extoll the virtue of the state and/or nation rather than to remember and commemorate the memory of their victims. As he points out, what Pierre Nora once termed a “purely French legislative sport”⁵⁵ has become ever more prominent across Eastern Europe. However, highlighting the role cultural framing, regime type, and societal context play, in Eastern Europe these laws have tended to be very different in their intent than the legislation that was passed in Western Europe beginning in the mid-1980s.⁵⁶

Moreover, as Koposov and Soroka note in their respective discussions of the “mnemonic triangle” of Poland–Russia–Ukraine, the politics of memory engaged in by one state often have cross-border effects.⁵⁷ The changing mnemonic relations evinced between post-communist Poland and Ukraine illustrate this nicely. The two states had largely been able to put the past behind them until more overtly ethno-nationalist leaders assumed power in Kyiv in 2014 and Warsaw in 2015. At this point, their shared history became much more problematic in relations between them. For example, in 2015 Ukraine passed a quartet of so-called de-communication laws, the most controversial of which made it illegal to publicly denigrate the memory of any twentieth-century organization that fought for national independence, including the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which collaborated for a time with the Nazis and was responsible for the ethnic cleansing of Polish civilians in Volhynia and eastern Galicia during the 1940s. This caused a cascade of confrontation over historical legacies, the end result of which was that Poland in 2018 passed legislation specifically singling out the crimes of Ukrainian nationalists and groups such as the UPA (it was voided by the Constitutional Tribunal the following year).

The above highlights how conflictual memory politics may constitute a significant factor in altering relations between states. Additionally, the media frequently affect these cross-border dynamics. As Krawatzek highlights, support for Vladimir Putin is exceptionally robust not only among Russian-language media consumers in Latvia but also those in Estonia and Finland, despite (or perhaps because of) their detachment from the political and economic realities in Russia.⁵⁸

Historical Minorities and the Movement of Borders

The presence of historical minority groups often contributes to the existence of subversive memories, forming a vital component for understanding the circulation of mnemonic narratives provided that these groups have not lost their distinctive identities.⁵⁹ Indeed, particularistic interpretations of the past serve to establish and uphold the cohesion of these groups,⁶⁰ making the integration of persistently visible minorities a major challenge for states attempting to construct unitary national narratives.

The Hungarian minority in Slovakia illustrates this phenomenon clearly, as it mobilizes historical references not so much to challenge the Slovakian national narrative as to prevent itself from falling into oblivion in the face of steadily declining population numbers. References to past Hungarian leaders and select historical

events serve to self-referentially construct a minority identity and give meaning to its cultural reproduction over long spans of time. For this reason, Hungarians in Slovakia are disproportionately concerned with their mnemonic links to the Hapsburg dynasty and nineteenth-century Austria-Hungary. That nobody currently alive has any personal memories of this period only contributes to the high degree of nostalgia inherent in its recall. At the same time, the threats to the community that were present in these earlier periods (such as during the 1848 Uprising) are rhetorically transposed onto the present, amplifying the risk scenario for Hungarians residing in Slovakia today. Commemorations of past events in this context are also seen as a subtler way of expressing identity, one distanced from outright calls for autonomy, which is a highly sensitive subject in Slovakia as it invokes the successful Slovak strategy that used “autonomy” in 1938 as a stepping-stone for later independence from Czechoslovakia in 1939. For this reason, Hungarian elites in Slovakia eschew this semantically charged term and instead retreat to local and regional development narratives and claims to “self-governance” as a means through which to strive for *de facto* autonomy.⁶¹

A rather different minority group is analyzed in Krawatzek’s study of Russian speakers living in Latvia.⁶² Here, the minority is not concerned about its cultural survival, especially as it has the backing of a strong regional power in its immediate neighborhood. Rather, the narratives about the past that the Russian community in Latvia mobilizes directly challenge the Latvian national narrative. As a survey on attitudes toward collaboration during World War II demonstrates, views on history differ profoundly between young Russian and Latvian speakers. Indicative of this, whereas the Latvian speakers’ responses convey a need to defend a nationalized version of history that emphasizes resistance to the Nazi occupiers, Russian speakers accept the existence of Latvian collaboration at a much higher rate.

However, it is worth emphasizing that subversive narratives about the past, though frequently propounded by minorities, may also occur when broader societal understandings of history do not match up with those being promulgated by elite actors. Along these lines, Soroka demonstrates how the official coverup of who the true perpetrators of the Katyń massacre were during the Soviet era produced powerful counter-narratives in Poland, where it was long suspected by many that the killings were engineered by the Soviet NKVD rather than the occupying Germans.

Legacies of Past Populations

It is not only extant minorities that may challenge the legitimacy of unified national narratives. Across Eastern Europe, the groups that were killed or displaced during World War II continue to matter, as their stories are not easily reconciled with sanitized depictions of the past. Foremost among them are the Jews, who suffered extreme violence during World War II and whose mnemonic shadow continues to linger despite their physical absence. Such a dynamic is observable, for

example, in the case of the Hungarian Holocaust museum, which the political elite in Hungary criticized for not paying adequate attention to the Hungarian rescuers of the Jews. This resulted in the creation of an officially “correct” museum that sidelined the fact that the Hungarian state collaborated with the Germans in the murder of Jews.⁶³

The memory of the Holocaust is particularly vexing for states that were allied with the Nazis (i.e., Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia), especially as within some of them revisionist national accounts have developed stressing that they were the victims of German aggression. In such narratives, Jewish suffering is often perceived as standing in a zero-sum relationship with one’s own suffering. Indeed, the Holocaust is frequently treated as competing with both the nationalized recall of World War II and the Soviet war myth.⁶⁴ As Kaposov observes in stressing the interpretive malleability involved in these processes, “anti-fascism has paradoxically merged in Russia and Poland with their national traditions of near-fascism.” Moreover, as Krawatzek’s piece suggests, given the present-day absence of Jewish communities in this region, there are hardly any vocal actors left to challenge the heroic national-partisan myth, which conveniently ignores the existence of widespread anti-Semitism among the partisan movement.⁶⁵

Proximity of Victims and Perpetrators

Those who committed crimes against humanity and those that suffered them in Eastern Europe have frequently continued to reside side-by-side after World War II ended and communism collapsed. This coexistence has generated a particularly conflictual setting, especially because the sort of victim-centered historical interpretation that evolved in Germany, France or the United States over the course of the 1970s and 1980s remains notably absent in the region. Consequently, these societies do not represent their history primarily as one centered on the victims of World War II; instead, there exists a far-reaching emphasis on collective resistance to the Nazi occupation.

But such narratives are rarely entirely successful. The case of Yugoslavia is particularly instructive in this regard. An inclusive founding myth could not take hold despite being actively propounded by the government, as Yugoslavia was a country where victims and perpetrators continued to live in close proximity after the war, often even in the same village. Obviously, the experience of violence cannot simply be erased from a local population’s memory.⁶⁶ Just as it was erroneous to think about the post-communist transitions as a *tabula rasa*,⁶⁷ it was likewise not possible for the Yugoslav population to effortlessly leave behind the bloody interethnic conflict it experienced during World War II in order to build a new society. The presence of the memory of that violence, and the conflictive interpretations accorded it within local communities, made it extremely difficult for elite-led narratives stressing national unity to resonate, as these threatened to wipe out personal experiences of the war.

The impact of contested interpretations of history existing in close proximity to one another is likewise attested by the Latvian case, where divergent assessments of the Red Army's role in the War—as representing liberation or a renewed occupation—continue to divide different ethnic communities.⁶⁸

The experience of violence in the region and the proximity of perpetrators and victims also plays out at the interstate level. As previous scholarship has demonstrated, recognizing the commission of crimes against humanity by the state and apologizing for them can serve as an important factor in international relations.⁶⁹ Soroka illustrates this through the competing historical narratives adopted by Polish and Russian elites relative to the Katyń massacre and how these have varied over time.⁷⁰ The Polish side has long expected greater Russian contrition and cooperation in investigating this crime. Consequently, when Moscow's shifting politics of history selectively rehabilitated the Soviet past beginning in the mid-2000s, this not only altered Russian perceptions about Katyń, but also strained diplomatic relations between the two neighboring states.

Conditioning Factors of Remembrance

Memory is conditioned by its constantly evolving contextual embeddedness and circumscribed by socio-cultural norms. As a result, historical narratives that violate what are regarded as acceptable boundaries will be viewed as illegitimate, transgressive, or simply not meaningful.⁷¹ How the past is politically recalled, therefore, depends on the interaction of culturally conditioned rules concerning *what* is appropriate to discuss, *how* it is to be discussed, and *who* the mnemonic entrepreneurs are that construct historical narratives. To this end, we consider three specific conditioning factors: (a) the relationship of memory to regime type; (b) the relationship of memory to supranational projects such as that of European integration; (c) the societal platforms on which, and media through which, the past is discussed.

Regime Type

With respect to institutional factors, regime type is particularly consequential. Authoritarian regimes, and to a more limited extent electoral democracies that lean toward populism or ethno-nationalism, are less accommodating of pluralistic historical narratives than are liberal democracies, which are expected to “agree to disagree” more readily when it comes to how the past should be understood. Moreover, the former frequently feature officially sanctioned interpretations of the past, with narratives that differ relegated to a subversive status or banned outright. As Krawatzek argues, in the Belarusian context, where there exists an enforced official view of World War II, narratives that question the selflessness and moral uprightness of the partisans or admit the existence of collaboration would hardly find a larger discursive

space.⁷² However, even if the political situation allowed these to be interjected into broader discourse, they very likely would not resonate due to the societal emphasis placed on the partisan contribution to the victory in World War II.⁷³

But this phenomenon is not just confined to the domestic sphere. As Soroka argues, there are cross-border effects related to regime type that directly impinge on how disputes over the past progress in relations between states.⁷⁴ A commitment to liberal norms, for instance, helps to explain why Poland and Russia were able to successfully defuse long-standing political tensions surrounding the Katyń massacre in the early 1990s. It also suggests why relations over Katyń, along with other elements of their mutually shared past, rapidly deteriorated when Russian president Vladimir Putin began steering post-Soviet Russia in a more authoritarian direction and an avowedly nationalistic government was installed in Warsaw in 2005 (and again in 2015).

This also has implications for how political opponents who hold mnemonic views that differ from those of the ruling elite are perceived and treated. In authoritarian regimes or illiberal democracies, dissenters are typically regarded as existential enemies in a zero-sum political game rather than bearers of different viewpoints who can be engaged and reasoned with. Regime type likewise has a bearing on how the masses, as well as cultural and economic elites, are viewed by those in positions of political power and the opportunities, or lack thereof, they have for influencing historical discourses.

The rise of challenges to liberal democracy in post-communist Europe is closely related to the ascendance of mnemonic contestation in the political arena. Furthermore, this trend has been exacerbated by the divergence of what were once accepted as the region's dominant narratives. In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union's demise, for example, Russian President Boris Yeltsin was highly critical of Stalinism and the political repressions associated with it, which rendered the Kremlin's official narrative congruent with the narratives emanating from newly elected non-communist leaders in capitals like Riga, Tallinn, and Prague. However, Russian attitudes toward the past have changed markedly since then. Most of this reshaping occurred during the second Putin presidency (2004–2008), by which time the Kremlin's decision makers had become convinced that Western powers would never treat Russia as an equal.⁷⁵ As a result, Russia's official historical line turned increasingly in a statist direction, intent on establishing a legitimate continuity between the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the post-Soviet Russian Federation. While this development proved politically useful on the domestic front, where many rued the dissolution of the USSR, it was in large measure brought about by changes in the wider geopolitical context. But while shifts in historical policy may be predicated on external exigencies, they may also cause the development of international tensions.

Similarly, controversies surrounding monuments and other physical manifestations of the past speak to the effects of cultural framing and its cross-border salience.

Divald illustrates this in discussing how the youth movement *Via Nova* began to renovate Hungarian tombstones after a 2005 law threatened to remove them if cemetery fees had not been paid for five or more years.⁷⁶ Among the different tombstones, the organization chose to renovate the tomb of a Czechoslovak senator who had represented the Hungarian minority and worked for peaceful coexistence during the interwar period. Other controversies around monuments that address the uneasy coexistence of different national narratives include the banning of Hungarian President László Solyom from entering Slovakia to unveil a statue of King St. Stephen and the debate between a local mayor and Prime Minister Robert Fico on the placement of two key Slovak national figures in the town of Komárom.

Supranational Integration

The countries of Eastern Europe also have to respond—either by assent or dissent—to the mnemonic frames propounded by Russia and the EU, the region's two major influence brokers. In particular, EU norms of remembering, namely the stress placed on the centrality of victimhood and the specificity of the Holocaust, have played a significant role in structuring contemporary mnemonic politics in Eastern Europe. At the same time, they have also provoked a populist backlash against narratives seen as disparaging the nation. Right-wing governments in countries such as Latvia and Poland have uncritically glorified the nation's resistance in World War II. Simultaneously, a movement has emerged that seeks to counter the prevailing Russian-sponsored narrative of the Red Army's liberation of the region; some of its adherents even seek to ascribe co-responsibility to the USSR for the outbreak of World War II.⁷⁷ Meanwhile, many former Warsaw Pact members also want to have the EU more overtly recognize the suffering of those states that endured communism.⁷⁸

The failure to constitute a pan-European memory project, reflected in the tepid reception accorded to the opening of the House of European History in Brussels in 2017, may be regarded as a threat to Europe's stability. The same holds true for regionally oriented attempts to achieve trade and infrastructural integration. For example, while the Three Seas Initiative—which was established in 2016 and focuses on the states located between the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic Seas⁷⁹—purports to complement rather than compete with the EU, it nevertheless represents a fundamental reconceptualization of spatial thinking from an east–west axis to one that is north–south in its orientation.⁸⁰ The project also resonates historically with the *Intermarium* initiative, a proposed union of neighboring states advocated by Poland's interwar leader, Józef Piłsudski. The *Intermarium*, in turn, which was conceived of as a bulwark against undue German and Russian influence, echoes a prior center of alternate regional legitimacy, namely the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, recall of which implicitly challenges the hegemonic pretensions of many of the mnemonic narratives currently dominant in Europe.

Technology and the New Media

The last factor that is crucial for understanding the regional dynamics that condition memory concerns *technology and the new media*. This is obviously not a point on which Eastern Europe differs from other regions, but rather one that speaks to linkages between regional and global dynamics. Cross-border connections between people include the transfer of political and cultural ideas in the form of remittances,⁸¹ the circulation of which is particularly important for Eastern Europe.⁸² Indeed, these connections not only have the power to increase the bonds between places of residence and origin, but also between members of ethnic communities that live in different migratory contexts. Especially given the increasing availability of television channels and newspapers online, the media play an ever-greater role in enabling previously localized interpretations of the past to travel widely.

Noteworthy in this regard is the transnational media sphere, which not only serves as a conduit of news, but—because of its linkage to linguistic and therefore cultural rules—is also capable of cultivating particular versions of history. Russian-language media, for instance, frame World War II in terms of the Red Army's victory over fascism, morally obligating Russians around the world to honor those who died in achieving it. This affective management of history constructs an emotional link with the past rather than promoting critical engagement with it.⁸³ Not only have Russian-language media enabled the spread of Russo-centric modes of commemorating Victory Day to neighboring states, but the resulting mediatization of these commemorations further augments their visibility. After all, the number of Russian participants in Helsinki's Immortal Regiment marches in 2017 and 2018 was small (somewhere between 200 and 300), but their visibility, given the event's coverage, was considerable. Social media algorithms only amplify these effects and reinforce how the past is interpreted within discrete ethnic and linguistic communities.

Moreover, the growing presence of a global media, both in terms of the availability of news and the means by which it is disseminated, has contributed to the deterritorialization of memory. In particular, social media outlets like Facebook, VKontakte, Instagram, and YouTube have all lowered the bar for mnemonic entrepreneurship and activism, making it possible to participate in, and comment on, historical events without the need to be physically engaged with them.

Actors and Claims to Memory

Interpretations of the past require agents who vocalize them, endow them with authenticity, and mobilize the resources required for them to be heard in public discourse. Defining which actors are considered legitimate players in the struggle over memory is closely linked to the previous topic of conditioning factors. Political regimes, as well as cultural norms, meaningfully influence who is entitled, and permitted, to speak on behalf of whom. Four types of actors, and the relationships

between them, stand out when it comes to appreciating the dynamics of memory in Eastern Europe: (a) societal elites (especially pertinent in this regard are political and cultural elites, but economic elites may also play an important role); (b) social movements and civil society associations; (c) society at large and the opinions it holds, with the development of mass-level collective memory feeding into the process of national remembering; (d) those who claim to speak on behalf of others, the latter voiceless because they no longer constitute a meaningful demographic presence in the region.

Elites: Driving or Driven?

For political elites, seeking recourse to mnemonic narratives has become a critical component of the fight for power, with the mobilization of the past having turned into a key facet of political legitimation and contestation.⁸⁴ Elite discourse, in this regard, is critical to analyze because it has the potential to shape the historical views of the wider society.⁸⁵

Elites, because they hold positions of power over society, have the ability to profoundly affect the content of the politics of memory. They may do so in a number of ways, including by instituting official commemorations, building monuments, and controlling how the past is depicted in school textbooks. However, the ways in which elites, their historical narratives, and the policies resulting from them interact across state borders is another critically understudied element. Soroka illustrates this in his analysis of how Russian understandings of Katyń and its commemoration changed with the transition of power from Yeltsin to Putin.⁸⁶ During the Yeltsin presidency, the Russian government acknowledged Soviet guilt for the massacre and exhibited a relatively open attitude toward the Polish understanding of it (despite the persistence of interpretive divisions among Russian elites), which contributed to improving relations between the two countries. Meanwhile, the prevailing Polish and Russian interpretation of Stalinism placed emphasis on mutual suffering. Beginning with Putin's tenure, however, this more integrative interpretation of history was abandoned and profound disagreements over how Katyń was to be viewed began to manifest.

Social Movements

Social movements and civil society constitute an important intermediary layer in the process of articulating demands from the masses to the political elite and, conversely, communicating elite stances on the politics of memory to wider society.⁸⁷ This is particularly the case in liberal democratic regimes, where the public sphere is most robustly developed.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, the societal importance and political relevance of such collectives has been widely recognized in various regime types, as exemplified by their role in the memorialization movement during the USSR's breakdown.⁸⁹

The Immortal Regiment is one such intermediary actor that has become a critical component of historical interpretations that embrace a pro-Russian view of World War II. What started as a private initiative in 2012 has evolved into an increasingly state-centered march that honors the victims of World War II but also functions to legitimate Russia's present-day political structure.⁹⁰ This movement has already spread across some seventy countries, with the Russian media portraying the marches as a sign of Russia's morally superior historical interpretation and an important challenge to the Eastern European (and to a lesser extent, Western) narrative. In Finland, as Davydova-Minguet illustrates, the participants of the Immortal Regiment see themselves as the true guardians of a memory that other European societies have forgotten, highlighting the horrors that Soviet society endured for the liberation of Europe from fascism.⁹¹ The transnational success of this movement is all the more interesting in that migrant groups have traditionally found it difficult to introduce their own mnemonic narratives into host societies given their inherent transcultural liminality and generally weaker socioeconomic positions.

Society at Large

Alongside those who get involved in social movements and civil society are ordinary citizens who maintain their own views on history without necessarily going out on the streets to proclaim them. Scholars have looked at public opinion concerning key historical figures to understand shifting attitudes in society.⁹² Especially significant in the context of the post-communist region, societal attitudes in Russia have become much more positive toward Stalin in recent years. Attesting to this, a March 2019 survey by the Moscow-based Levada Center found 51 percent of respondents held generally positive attitudes toward Stalin and 70 percent believed he had played a beneficial role for their country.⁹³ Predictably, this led to a media outcry in Eastern Europe and rampant speculation over what it portends for Russia's future political development.

Notwithstanding the difficulties in understanding the precise causal relations between public opinion and elite politics in the realm of memory, it appears societal attitudes toward historical personages and events are governed by the interaction of elite- and grassroots-level framing effects. Historical narratives are transmitted through families, the school system, media, and political discourse, and they tend to be "sticky." At the same time, people's attitudes toward historical events are generally insulated from the ebb and flow of quotidian politics, unlikely to shift in the short run absent fundamental political changes. One such moment of change in which mass attitudes toward historical events were quickly altered occurred in Ukraine after the 2013–2014 Maidan protests triggered Russia's annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of separatist violence in the Donbas.⁹⁴ In other contexts, as Krawatzek illustrates, altered political narratives may fail to affect deeper underlying systems of historical orientation among local language-based communities.⁹⁵

The Absent Presence

The last type of actor integral to the dynamics of memory politics is represented by groups that once existed on a given territory but no longer do so, and whose self-professed spokespeople are today primarily academics, journalists, human rights activists or coethnics in other countries. In this respect, Jewish diasporas are a major factor, as they constitute an authoritative voice for representing the Jewish historical experience in Eastern Europe. The modifications made to Poland's controversial 2018 memory law, which in its initial incarnation criminalized any attempts to besmirch the "good name" of the Polish nation in connection to World War II and the Holocaust, illustrate this dynamic, as Israeli disapprobation went a long way toward pushing the Polish government to alter the law's wording and remove its criminal penalties.⁹⁶

At the same time, these absent Jewish lives create an uneasy echo that political and societal actors in the region are forced to deal with, particularly as evidence continues to be unearthed regarding Jewish suffering at the hands of their fellow citizens.⁹⁷ Consequently, the Jewish communities of the past exhibit an agency that tarnishes the sanitized and mythologized memory of heroic resistance to the Nazi occupation that still prevails in Eastern Europe.

What makes such memories so problematic is that Jewish suffering challenges the very core of national identity for many Eastern European states. For example, in a country such as Belarus, the Jewish experience has few, if any, mnemonic advocates at the national level, which implies that inconvenient memories can be successfully sidelined in constructing the uncritical trope of the heroic partisan. But Belarus is not exceptional; Jewish suffering fits badly with the post-World War II national stories being told in a host of post-communist states. Illustrating this, Kopolov argues that overtly acknowledging the violence Jewish citizens of Poland experienced at the hands of fellow Poles would fundamentally undermine the dominant narrative of the Polish experience in World War II, a mytho-heroic one that cannot easily incorporate self-critical elements.⁹⁸

Conclusion

The articles in this special section demonstrate how much the interdisciplinary field of memory studies has developed over the last two decades in its ambitions, methodological diversity, and explanatory potential. While researching the implications of present-day interpretations of the past has long been an occupation of the humanities, it is particularly noteworthy that social scientists are now also taking up the challenge of studying this phenomenon. Fields like political science and sociology more and more enter memory studies, which has already yielded fascinating results.

Trying to advance this research agenda further, the contributions in this section all speak to different methodological approaches and engage with various aspects of the three key arenas that we have laid out in this introduction: (1) the

circulation of memory and the contestation of established narratives; (2) the conditioning factors of remembering (such as regime type or supranational integration), but also technological change; (3) the various actors engaged in the struggle over interpretive dominance.

Going further, we see several themes that can be exploited in upcoming research, for which this publication provides some groundwork. First, there is the need to consider in greater detail how specific memories and narratives of the past become entangled at the national and subnational levels, as well as across borders and through time. Examining this phenomenon is the major contribution of this special section, as all of our authors deal prominently with this theme. Still, further work remains to be done.

Second, there is the potential to deepen the study of memory and its societal impact through sophisticated methods and refined conceptual approaches. Within this section, Krawatzek is the most deliberate in his attempt to do so; list experiments and vignette priming hold great promise in assessing the historical views that individuals may hold. But there still exists much fertile ground to be plowed. One promising direction, for example, would be experimental research that measures the physiological effects on individuals of various historical figures and narratives. Another might involve applying web scraping, machine learning and automated content analysis to regional social media sources, along with employing mixed methods research designs that can complement the qualitative and small-n case studies that area specialists have long relied upon. While causal inference may not necessarily always be a desirable goal for projects focused on the past and its present-day ramifications, there remains a great deal of methodological rigor that can be fruitfully brought to bear on the questions that interest those who study the politics of memory.

Finally, we would suggest that while the past does indeed take a backseat in many situations to the centrality of economic and strategic concerns in political life, this does not mean that it should be regarded as epiphenomenal, or as having at best a marginal impact on formulating economic and strategic concerns. Overstating the divide between self-conception and material interest is a fraught and foolish undertaking. It is high time to decisively shift this paradigm. Material concerns exist not absent reference to the past but precisely as an outgrowth of it. Examining when and how beliefs about history shape wider political decision making remains a topic that has been virtually unexplored in a systematic fashion. That associated puzzles are both omnipresent and unresolved is what makes studying how the past affects the present such a promising and exciting field of research.

ORCID iDs

Félix Krawatzek  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1108-6087>

George Soroka  <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2796-315X>

Notes

1. The Balkan states are included in our discussion of the region. This choice reflects the geographical region covered by *EEPS*.

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11. Olga Davydova-Minguet, "Performing Memory in Conflicting Settings," *East European Politics and Societies*, part of this special section.

12. Nikolay Koposov, "Populism and Memory: Legislation of the Past in Poland, Ukraine, and Russia," in *East European Politics and Societies*, part of this special section.

13. Susan Divald, "Looking to the Past to Survive the Future: The Hungarian Minority in Slovakia," in *East European Politics and Societies*, part of this special section.

14. George Soroka, "Recalling Katyń: Poland, Russia and the Interstate Politics of History," in *East European Politics and Societies*, part of this special section.

15. Félix Krawatzek, "Remembering a Contentious Past: Resistance and Collaboration in the Former Soviet Union," in *East European Politics and Societies*, part of this special section.

16. Davydova-Minguet, "Performing Memory in Conflicting Settings."

17. Divald, "Looking to the Past to Survive the Future."

18. Rolf Fredheim, "The Memory of Katyn in Polish Political Discourse: A Quantitative Study," *Europe-Asia Studies* 66, no. 7 (2014): 1165–87.

19. Divald, "Looking to the Past to Survive the Future."

20. Krawatzek, "Remembering a Contentious Past."

21. Soroka, "Recalling Katyń"; Koposov, "Populism and Memory."

22. Félix Krawatzek and George Soroka, "Bringing the Past Into the Present: Toward a New Social Scientific Research Agenda," *Journal of Politics* 80, no. 4 (2018): e74–e79.

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Félix Krawatzek is a senior researcher at the Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOIS), as well as an associate member of Nuffield College. Previously, he held a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellowship at the University of Oxford where he also earned his doctorate. He has published on questions related to collective memory, youth, and migration.

George Soroka is Lecturer on Government and Assistant Director of Undergraduate Studies in the Government Department at Harvard University, from where he received his PhD. His research interests include the politics of memory, religion and politics, and regime transitions in comparative perspective.